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The Future of Transferable 
Development Rights in the 
Supreme Court 
BY LINDA A. MALoNE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite growing utilization of transferable development rights 
(TDRs) to insulate land use measures from taking challenges,' 
the Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of whether TDRs 
can salvage government regulation that would otherwise consti-
tute a taking of private property without just compensation. The 
saving grace of TDRs is that they may permit an owner of 
property that has been restrictively zoned to recoup any eco-
nomic loss on the restricted property by selling the property's 
severed development rights to receiving properties authorized for 
increased density of development. 2 In theory at least, the use of 
• Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas Law School, Fayetteville. 
B.A. 1975, Vassar College; J.D. 1978, Duke Law School; LL.M. 1984, University of 
Illinois College of Law. 
1 See Duncan, Toward a Theory of Broad-based Planning for the Preservation 
of Agricultural Land, 24 NAT. REsoURcEs J. 61, 121-22 (1984). For an overview of 
farmland preservation techniques, including TDRs, see NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDs 
STUDY, FINAL REPORT (1981). See generally Keene, A Review of Governmental Policies 
and Techniques for Keeping Farmers Farming, 19 NAT. REsoURCES J. 119 (1979); Myers, 
Farmland Preservation in a Democratic Society: Looking to the Future, 1981-82 AGRIC. 
L.J. 605. 
For a thorough discussion of the taking clause, see F. BossELMAN, D. CALLIES & 
J. BANTA, THE TAKING IssUE (1973). 
2 For an analysis of the mechanics of various TDR schemes, see Merriam, Making 
TDR Work, 56 N.C.L. REv. 77 (1978); Torres, Helping Farmers and Saving Farmland, 
37 OKLA. L. REv. 31, 38-45 (1984). 
A preservation technique related to the transfer of development rights is the 
technique of purchase of development rights. In such a program the development rights 
are purchased by a local planning agency to hold in abeyance indefinitely (in what has 
been referred to as "land banking") or until a decision is made to release them for 
further development. E. ROBERTS, THE LAW AND THE PRESERVATION OF AGRICULTURAL 
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TDRs precludes taking clause objections. Restricted landowners 
cannot claim that the restrictive zoning has deprived them of the 
economic value of the restricted property, since any economic 
loss can be compensated through sale of the TDRs. In this way, 
TDRs have proven to be useful as a tool for preservation of 
properties-such as farmland, landmarks, historic sites and open 
space-which are threatened by approaching development. 
The growing popularity of using TDRs as a farmland and 
historic site preservation device makes it quite likely that the 
Supreme Court soon will find it necessary to face the constitu-
tional issues that TDRs pose. A likely factual scenario for the 
Court would be as follows: A landowner owns two or more 
contiguous parcels of property in an area of growing develop-
ment, and the land has been zoned for commercial or residential 
use. One of the parcels of property is undeveloped-that is, the 
property has no commercial development and little or no resi-
dential development-and, in that state of undevelopment, the 
property provides agricultural, aesthetic or ecological benefit to 
the rapidly developing community. The county zoning board 
then rezones the landowner's property so that the undeveloped 
parcel must remain undeveloped, but the landowner's other con-
tiguous parcels of property are to retain the same density of 
development as under the prior zoning ordinances. To compen-
sate for the restrictions on the undeveloped parcel, the county 
zoning ordinances provide that the parcel's unused development 
rights may be transferred: (a) to the owner's other contiguous 
and noncontiguous property or (b) to other designated, contig-
uous or noncontiguous lots under different ownership. The land-
owner subsequently submits a development plan for the 
LAND 76-77 (1982). Ironically, in light of recent Supreme Court opinions which reflect 
unfavorably on the future of TDRs, the Supreme Court decided a case this term which 
substantiates claims of a public purpose justifying the use of eminent domain for 
purchase of development rights. In Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S. Ct. 2321 
(1984), the Court found a valid public use for state condemnation of private land in 
order to reduce concentration of ownership. The Court held that, where the exercise of 
the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, a 
compensated taking will not be prohibited by the public use clause of the fifth amend-
ment. /d. at 2330. 
For other legal challenges to TDRs in an agricultural context, see Appeal of John 
MacEachran, 438 A.2d 302 (N.H. 1981); Louthan v. King County, 617 P.2d 977 (Wash. 
1980). See generally Peterson & McCarthy, Farmland Preservation by Purchase of 
Development Rights: The Long Island Experiment, 26 DE PAULL. REv. 447 (1978). 
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undeveloped parcel to the zoning board, but the board disap-
proves the plan in accordance with the newly passed ordinances. 
The landowner then files suit in state court claiming damages 
for inverse condemnation and seeks a declaratory judgment that 
the ordinances have effectuated a taking of property without 
just compensation. 
Assuming for purposes of the hypothetical that the restric-
tions imposed on the undeveloped parcel deprive it of all or 
almost all of its economic value, 3 a court faced with a challenge 
to the validity of the ordinance could take any one of several 
approaches. First, the court could compare the value of all of 
the landowner's contiguous property to the value of the TDRs 
and conclude that the restrictions on the one parcel do not 
constitute a taking because they do not sufficiently deprive the 
landowner of the economic return on the property as a whole. 
In reaching such a conclusion, the court might even take into 
consideration the owner's noncontiguous property on which the 
TDRs might be used. Secondly, the court could focus only upon 
the economic detriment to the restricted parcel, and conclude 
that the conferral of the TDRs salvages the constitutionality of 
the ordinance from a taking challenge even if the ordinance 
would otherwise be a taking of the restricted par~el. Alterna-
tively, again focusing only on the restricted parcel, the court 
could find, without considering the value of the TDRs, that 
there had been a taking. The court then would have to determine 
whether the TDRs satisfy the constitutional requisites for just 
compensation. 
The foregoing hypothetical would raise two as yet unresolved 
issues of fundamental importance to every TDR scheme: (1) 
What is the appropriate unit of property in relation to which a 
taking is to be evaluated? and (2) Is the value of TDRs relevant 
to whether a taking has occurred or relevant only to whether 
just compensation has been provided once a taking has been 
found? 
A TDR scheme poses unique problems in defining the unit 
of property which is allegedly being taken. In the usual zoning 
situation, the unit or units of property for taking purposes will 
3 This assumption is necessary in that otherwise there would be no taking without 
consideration of the TDRs, and, therefore, no need for a court to evaluate the legal 
effect of the TDRs on the taking or just compensation issues. 
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be determined to a large extent by the challenged action of the 
zoning authority. If the parcels are separately rezoned and/ or 
treated as separate parcels by the zoning authority, the reviewing 
court is more likely to determine the taking issue separately with 
regard to each parcel, even if the landowner is claiming that 
both parcels have been taken. 4 If the landowner claims that only 
one of the contiguous parcels is being taken, however, the courts 
differ as to whether to consider the effect on the landowner's 
contiguous property as a whole or on the restricted parcel only.s 
The TDR situation is further complicated by the fact that 
the restricted parcel is economically and administratively linked 
to the receiving area for the TDRs, which may be contiguous or 
noncontiguous parcels and which may be under the same or 
different ownership from that of the restricted parcel.6 In eval-
uating the economic effect of the zoning on the landowner's 
"property," should contiguous nonreceiving parcels under the 
same ownership be part of the property? Further, should con-
tiguous and/ or noncontiguous receiving parcels under the same 
ownership be part of the property? 
Another question is whether the value of the TDRs should 
be relevant initially in determining whether a taking has oc-
curred, or if it should be relevant only in deciding whether just 
compensation has been provided if a taking is otherwise found. 
• See, e.g., City of Hollywood v. Hollywood, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1332, 1338 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App.), reviewed denied, 441 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1983); Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 445 
A.2d 46, 68-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982); Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington County, 
581 P.2d 50,61 (Or. 1978). See also American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. County of Marin, 
653 F.2d 364, 371 (9th Cir. 1981) (until owner submitted plan, impossible to determine 
whether property was to be treated as one parcel or as two). 
5 Compare American Dredging Co. v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 
404 A.2d 42, 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) (restricted area held to comprise only 
30/o of total property and Multnomah County v. Howell, 496 P.2d 235, 238 (Or. Ct. App. 
1972) (though 4 of plaintiff's 9 lots were subject to restriction, court considered them 
one piece of property) with Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. 
Rptr. 191, 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (beachfront and uplands of tract treated as two 
different tracts for purposes of allocating compensating densities), appeal dismissed, 104 
S. Ct. 53 (1983). See also Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1192 (Ct. Cl. 
1981) (permitting requirements only covered portions of tracts), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 
1017 (1982); Maple Leaf Investors, Inc. v. State Dep't of Ecology, 565 P.2d 1162, 1163 
(Wash. 1977) (restrictions did not apply to 300Jo of property). 
• See Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use 
Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 35, 50 (1974). 
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TDRs defy easy categorization as either regulation or compen-
sation. TDRs' hybrid character is reflected in the disagreement 
within the Supreme Court as to which of the two prongs of the 
taking test triggers consideration of TDRs.7 Compounding this 
disagreement, it appears that the Court is now less inclined than 
in the past to look at the landowner's economic situation as a 
whole in evaluating whether a taking has occurred. The focus 
may no longer be on how many "sticks" out of the bundle of 
rights known as property have been taken, but on which one or 
ones have been taken. Therefore, both the owner's vestigial 
rights following the governmental action and the extensiveness 
of the landowner's other property are less important to the 
analysis of taking. Instead, the result is concentration on the 
"nature" of the right invaded and its economic value to the 
landowner. Under the emerging view, the deprivation of one 
property right alone is more likely to result in a taking if that 
property right is economically significant, but the requisite de-
gree of significance has yet to be delineated.8 Thus far, the right 
to exclude others for competitive advantage has been of suffi-
cient economic significance that its deprivation has twice been 
held by the Court to constitute a taking.9 These cases cause one 
to wonder if the right to develop can be far behind. 
This Article will examine the Supreme Court's recent taking 
decisions to determine, from a taking perspective, what guidance 
they might provide as to the redeeming features of TDRs. 10 The 
Article will then identify the most likely situation in which the 
Court will have to determine the ability of a TDR scheme to 
withstand a taking challenge. 11 After examining the problem of 
defining the appropriate property unit for a taking challenge, 
the analysis will turn to whether the Court will consider the 
7 See text accompanying notes 18-38 infra. 
• See text accompanying notes 52-54 infra. 
9 See text accompanying notes 39-43, 55-64 infra. 
10 See text accompanying notes 14-64 infra. Scholarly writings on the constitution-
ality of TORs as a general matter are extensive. For a basic introduction to the debate, 
compare Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 
75 (1973-74) and Costonis, Fair Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Anti-
dotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 CoLUM. L. REv. 1021 
(1975) with Berger, The Accomodation Power in Land Use Controversies: A Reply to 
Professor Costonis, 76 CoLUM. L. REv. 799 (1976) and Note, The Unconstitutionality 
of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101 (1974-75). 
11 See text accompanying notes 65-107 infra. 
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availability of TDRs to be relevant to the taking issue or to the 
issue of what constitutes just compensation for the taking. 12 
Regardless of how these questions are answered, the overall 
taking issue will be determined by the economic viability of each 
individual TDR scheme. This Article suggests that, in its evalu-
ation of economic viability, the Court should be deferential to 
the judgment of the planning entity under established constitu-
tional doctrines of judicial review. 13 
I. Penn Central and its Progeny 
In 1978 the Supreme Court upheld the application to the 
Grand Central Terminal of New York City's Landmarks Pres-
ervation Law, rejecting in the process claims that this application 
of the law had taken the owners' property without just 
compensation14 and had arbitrarily deprived them of their prop-
erty without due process of law .15 To alleviate the economic 
burden placed on landmark owners, the preservation law per-
mitted affected owners to transfer their unusable development 
rights in the landmark site to other proximate lots. 16 The Penn 
Central decision triggered an optimistic flurry of innovative zon-
ing techniques that frequently employed the transferability of 
development rights to provide greater insulation against taking 
challenges. But Penn Central actually posited relatively limited 
reassurance for such zoning, and lower courts have had to grapple 
with the Court's repeated admission that taking challenges entail 
essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries. 17 
Without reaching the issue of whether a TDR could be just 
compensation, the Court in Penn Central did suggest that the 
availability of a TDR might be of some significance in deter-
mining whether a taking has occurred.18 The Penn Central Ter-
12 See text accompanying notes 107-66 infra. 
" See text accompanying notes 167-75 infra. 
14 The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution provides that private 
property shall not be "taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. CoNST. 
amend. V. The fourteenth amendment has been held to impose the same restricton on 
states and municipalities. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
104, 107 (1978). 
" See 438 U.S. 104. 
16 Id. at 109. 
17 See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984). 
18 See 438 U.S. at 137. 
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minal had been designated a landmark by the New York City 
Landmarks Preservation Commission, and, at that time, Penn 
Central did not seek judicial review of the designation. 19 Penn 
Central subsequently leased the air rights above th~ buildi~g for 
construction of an office building. 20 The Commission, however, 
disapproved two submitted plans for an office building more 
than fifty stories high because of the plans' adverse effects on 
the Terminal's historic and aesthetic features.21 Under New York 
City's zoning laws, owners of real property who had ~ot devel-
oped their property to the full extent permitted under applicable 
zoning laws were allowed to petition for transfer of their devel-
opment rights to other designated parcels of property.22 The 
Court noted that this right "enhances the economic position of 
the landmark owner in one significant respect.' ' 23 
Following the Commission's disapprpval of the mpltistory 
office plans, the Terminal owners filed spit, claiming an unlawful 
taking and denial of due process, and seeking a declaratory 
judgment, injunctive relief and damages. The damages were for 
the "temporary taking" which allegedly occurred between the 
landmark designation date and the date when the restrictiops 
from the landmark law would be lifted following the owners' 
success in court.24 The New York Court of Appeals refused to 
recognize any "regulatory taking11 clai:rp./5 and ultimately con-
cluded that there was no due process violation because Penn 
Central had not been deprived of a "reasonable return on [its] 
investment in the [property].m6 
On appeal, Justice Brennan acknowledged that the Supreme 
Court had been unable to develop any "set formula" for deter-
mining when economic injury capsed by governmental action 
requires compensation, and that each case necessitates "ad hoc, 
19 /d. at 115-16. 
"'!d. at 116. 
21 /d. at 117. 
22 /d. at 114-15. 
:n /d. at 113. 
"' !d. at 119. 
25 ld. at 121. In Penn Centrql, Justice Brennan noted that the Court does not 
"embrace the proposition that a 'taking' can never occur unless government has trans-
ferred physi~ control over a portion of a parcel." /d. at 123 n.25. 
:u; ld. at 121. 
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factual inquiries. " 27 The Court had little difficulty in determining 
that the diminution in value of the property did not constitute 
a taking within the meaning of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments, particularly in light of Penn Central's concession that 
the property was still capable of earning a reasonable return. 28 
In determining the diminution in value borne by Penn Central, 
the Court refused to define the affected property as "air rights;" 
it focused instead on the economic effects on the parcel as a 
whole, that is, the city tax block designated as the landmark 
site. 29 In reaching its holding, the Court addressed only briefly 
the relevance of the TDRs to the taking issue: 
[T]o the extent appellants have been denied the right to build 
above the Terminal, it is not literally accurate to say that they 
have been denied all use of even those pre-existing air rights. 
Their ability to use these rights has not been abrogated; they 
are made transferable to at least eight parcels in the vicinity 
of the Terminal, one or two of which have been found suitable 
for the construction of new office buildings. Although appel-
lants and others have argued that New York City's transferable 
development-rights program is far from ideal, the New York 
courts here supportably found that, at least in the case of the 
Terminal, the rights afforded are valuable. While these rights 
may well not have constituted "just compensation" if a "tak-
ing'' had occurred, the rights nevertheless undoubtedly mitigate 
whatever financial burdens the law has imposed on appellants 
and, for that reason, are to be taken into account in consid-
ering the impact of regulation. 30 
Having concluded that there was not a taking, the Court had 
no need to address the issue of whether the TDRs would have 
provided "just compensation" had a taking occurred. 
Although the majority seemed more inclined to consider the 
value of TDRs in relation to the taking issue, Justice Rehnquist 
in his dissent, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens, 
took a different approach. Justice Rehnquist concluded that the 
27 Id. at 124. 
28 Id. at 128-29. This strategic concession on the central issue in the case has been 
described by Professor Costonis as an inexplicable "boner of litigation strategy." Com-
ment, 30 LAND UsE LAw & ZoNING DIG. 9, 428 (1978). 
29 See 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
30 Id. at 137 (footnote omitted). 
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landmark preservation ordinance had taken Penn Central prop-
erty by restricting use of the property's air rights.Jl By singling 
out individual landowners, as opposed to the constitutionally 
acceptable zoning method of prohibiting certain uses over a 
broad cross section of land, the ordinance failed to guarantee 
landmark owners the " 'average reciprocity of advantage' " nec-
essary to fall within the traditional "zoning" exception to the 
taking prohibition. 32 In a footnote, Justice Rehnquist sharply 
criticized the Court's vacillating suggestions that the restrictions 
must have " 'an unduly harsh impact upon the owner's use of 
the property,' " prevent " 'a reasonable return' " on the land-
owner's investment, or prohibit the property from being " 'eco-
nomically viable' " to establish a taking.33 The dissent was 
specifically critical of any requirement that the property owner 
be denied all reasonable return on the property. Rehnquist stressed 
that the Court would not only have to define "reasonable re-
turn" for a variety of types of property, but would have to 
define the particular property unit to be examined.34 For exam-
ple, the Court would have to distinguish the restricted parcel of 
property itself from the air rights to the parcel and from all 
contiguous parcels of property owned by the restricted land-
owner. 
Nevertheless, Rehnquist would have remanded the case to 
the New York Court of Appeals "for a determination of whether 
TDRs constitute a 'full and perfect equivalent for the property 
taken'. " 35 As to whether the TDRs are a "full and perfect 
equivalent for the property taken, " 36 he considered as negative 
factors the severely limited area to which transfer was permitted, 
the complex procedures required to obtain a transfer permit, the 
uncertain and contingent market value of the TDRs, and the 
failure of the TDRs to reflect the value lost.37 As a factor 
31 See id. at 143 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting). 
32 Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Pennsylvania Coal-Co. v. Mahon, 
260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922)). For a critique of Justice Rehnquist's dissent utilizing the 
Court's decisions prior to Penn Central, see Torres, supra note 2, at 56-61. 
'' See 438 U.S. at 149 n.13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting majority opinion). 
,. See id. (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting). 
" Id. at 152 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. 
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893)). 
36 I d. at 151-52 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting). 
37 See id. at 151 (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting). 
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favoring the TDRs as just compensation, Rehnquist acknowl-
edged that Penn Central had been offered "substantial amounts" 
for its TDRs.38 
After Penn Central there followed a series of cases in which 
the character of the interference with the property right was 
outcome-determinative of the taking issue. In Kaiser Aetna v. 
United States, 39 the Corps of Engineers claimed the government 
had a navigational servitude40 on what had been a private lagoon, 
which the owners had connected to the Pacific Ocean, with 
Corps approval, in order to build an exclusive marina-based 
community. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist stated 
that the Court would decide the taking issue by examining "the 
economic impact of the regulation, its interference with reason-
able investment backed expectations, and the character of the 
governmental action."41 The Court rejected the government's 
claim that a navigational servitude existed. 42 Finding that public 
access would result in an actual physical invasion of private 
property by the government, Justice Rehnquist stated that im-
pairment of the property owners' right to exclude others would 
frustrate the owners' reasonable investment-backed expectations 
and, therefore, constitute a taking.43 
In contrast, in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,44 the 
Court upheld a state constitutional requirement that shopping 
center owners permit individuals to exercise their free speech 
and petition rights in the shopping center despite the owners' 
argument that they were being deprived of their property without 
compensation.45 In Prune Yard, as in Kaiser Aetna, the character 
of the governmental action was a physical invasion of private 
property.46 Justice Rehnquist, again speaking for the Court, 
suggested that deprivation of a right to exclude others by its 
38 See id. at 151-52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
39 444 u.s. 164 (1979) . 
.. A navigational servitude is a navigational easement giving the public a right of 
free access. The majority opinion in Kaiser Aetna v. United States further outlines the 
history of this concept. See id. at 175-76. 
41 /d. at 175. 
41 See id. at 179 . 
• , /d. at 179-80. 
44 447 u.s. 74 (1980). 
4
' See id. at 82-85. 
46 See id. at 77. 
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very nature is more likely to constitute a taking.47 In Prune Yard, 
however, the Court refused to !md the physical invasion to be 
dispositive because, not surprisingly, there was no showing that 
the right to exclude others was important to the economic value 
of the shopping center. 48 
The Court's emphasis on the character of the governmental 
interference reached its peak in Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
hattan CATV Corp.49 In an opinion by Justice Marshall, from 
which Justices Blackmun, Brennan and White dissented, the 
physical invasion resulting from a television· cable installed on 
an apartment owner's roof, as authorized under New York law, 
was held to constitute a taking of the apartment owner's prop-
erty without compensation.50 Despite the minimal interference 
by the cable in the owner's enjoyment of his property, the Court 
held the physical invasion to be a "per se" taking of private 
property.51 Thus, the character of the governmental action has 
become, not merely a factor, but the only factor in finding a 
taking when the governmental action is a physical invasion of 
property. 
This series of physical intrusion cases provides little direct 
guidance as to the direction the Court will take after Penn 
Central in evaluating TDR techniques. Indeed, the Court in 
Loretto took care to distinguish between land use regulations 
and physical intrusions in taking cases.52 These cases are instruc-
tive, however, in tracing the apparent "wooing away" of Justices 
Stewart, White and Powell from the Penn Central majority to 
Justice Rehnquist's views as expressed in his dissent in that case. 
•
7 See id. at 82 . 
... See id. at 83 . 
•• 458 u.s. 419 (1982). 
"' See id. at 421. 
" See id. at 434-35. 
"As Penn Central affirms, the Court has often upheld substantial regulation 
of an owner's use of his own property where deemed necessary to promote 
the public interest. At the same time, we have long considered a physical 
intrusion by government to be a property restriction of an unusually serious 
character for purposes of the Takings Clause. Our cases further establish 
that when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a permanent 
physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case, "the character 
of the ,government action" not only is an important factor in resolving 
whether the action works a taking but is determinative. 
Id. at 426. 
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In Penn Central Justice Rehnquist declined to determine whether 
a taking had occurred by applying some gradation of economic 
deprivation to some undefined unit of property as a whole. 53 
Rehnquist thus refused to follow an approach in which the 
owner's property as a whole would be examined to determine 
whether the government action had an "unduly harsh" economic 
impact, prevented "a reasonable return" on the owner's invest-
ment or kept the property from being "economically viable."54 
Rehnquist's approach, and the approach generally taken in 
Kaiser Aetna and the cases which followed, is to first determine 
which of the so-called "bundle of sticks" constituting property 
has been taken (for example, the right to exclude others), and 
then to determine how important that "stick" is to the use or 
economic value of the property. If that property right is of an 
as yet unspecified level of significance to the economic value or 
use of the property, then its deprivation alone may constitute a 
taking. 
In contrast, the Penn Central majority would be more in-
clined to examine the entire bundle of sticks, (for example, the 
full fee interest or all the landowner's contiguous property) and 
refuse to find a taking unless some significant number of sticks 
had been destroyed by the governmental action. The implications 
for any land use regulation that severely restricts development 
cannot be ignored. Following Justice Rehnquist's approach, the 
denial of a right to develop one's property could be important 
to the economic value of the property for the landowner. Thus, 
the deprivation of a single important property right, one stick 
in the bundle, could be a taking. Under the approach of the 
Penn Central majority, deprivation of one property right alone 
would rarely constitute a taking. The landowner would still have 
use of all the property rights other than the right to develop, 
and the only question would be whether the economic value of 
the property as a whole had been destroyed. In sum, under 
Justice Rehnquist's approach the nature of the property right 
taken becomes more important than what property rights re-
main. 
53 See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra. 
,. See text accompanying note 33 supra. 
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Although the majority and the dissenters were unable to 
agree in Penn Central on the extent of economic deprivation 
necessary to constitute a taking, the Court was able to agree on 
some general guidelines in the recent case of Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Company.55 In Monsanto, the Court determined that 
under Missouri law trade secrets were property for purposes of 
the fifth amendment's taking clause.56 In addition to disclosing 
some of the data to the public pursuant to the provisions of the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),57 
the Environmental Protecton Agency (EPA) had utilized trade 
secret information submitted to it for pesticide registration by 
Monsanto, a pesticide manufacturer, in order to evaluate other 
pesticide manufacturers' applications for registration. 58 
On behalf of a unanimous Court59 Justice Blackmun stated 
that whether a governmental action has gone beyond "regula-
tion" to a "taking" depends upon " 'the character of the gov-
ernmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with 
reasonable investment backed expectations,' " 60 a test first for-
mulated in Penn Central. The Penn Central Court focused only 
on the last factor as being so "overwhelming" under the facts 
of that case as to be dispositive of the taking question. 61 Ac-
cording to the Monsanto Court, the explicit governmental guar-
antee of confidentiality in the 1972 amendments to FIFRA was 
the basis for Monsanto's reasonable investment-backed expec-
tation.62 The EPA's disclosure and utilization of the data de-
" 104 S. Ct. 2862 (1984). 
,. See id. at 2874. 
,., 7 u.s.c. § 136 (1982). 
,. 104 S. Ct. at 2866-67. 
59 Justice White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. Id. at 
2883. Justice O'Connor dissented only as to that portion of the Court's opinion which 
concluded that Monsanto did not have a reasonable investment-backed expectation that 
the EPA would maintain the confidentiality of data submitted prior to the 1972 amend-
ments to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). Id. at 2883-
84. 
60 Id. at 2875 (quoting PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. at 83). 
•• See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 124. 
61 Justice O'Connor dissented as to that portion of the court's opinion that 
Monsanto had no expectation of confidentiality prior to the 1972 amendments to FIFRA. 
Noting that, prior to 1972, FIFRA essentially was silent as to confidentiality, Justice 
O'Connor concluded that agency practice, the Trade Secrets Act and the applicant's 
reasonable expectations also made any disclosure of data prior to 1972 a taking of the 
data. See 104 S. Ct. at 2883-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
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prived Monsanto of its "right to exclude others [which] is central 
to the very definition of the property interest'' in a trade secret. 63 
The essential economic value of the property right lay in the 
competitive advantage-an advantage destroyed by disclosure of 
the data; consequently, the remaining uses of the data were 
"irrelevant to the determination of the economic impact" of the 
EPA's action o'n Monsanto's property right.64 For the first time 
in a case not involving a physical invasion, the Court found that 
the importance of the property interest invaded outweighed con-
sideration of any remaining rights in the property. 
II. THE MOST LIKELY SCENARIO FOR 
THE COURT: OPEN SPACE ZONING AND TDRs 
A. Judicial Dodgeball and TDRs 
In three cases, Agins v. City of Tiburon,65 San Diego Gas & 
Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,66 and Aptos Seascape Corp. 
v. County of Santa Cruz, 67 the Court skirted taking claims in 
which TDRs played pivotal roles. In each case, zoning to pre-
serve open space \vas tempered by conferral of TDRs on the 
open space lots. The likelihood of such a case appearing before 
63 Id. at 2878. 
64 Id. Cf. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979). In Andrus, Justice Brennan 
(writing for all of the justices except Chief Justice Burger who concurred) held that the 
prohibition of the sale of eagle feathers as applied to traders in preexisting bird artifacts 
was not a taking. The Court stated: 
The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the arti-
facts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them .... In this 
case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport 
their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds .... [L]oss of 
future profits-unaccompanied by any physical property restriction-pro-
vides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim. 
Id. at 65-66. It is difficult to see how the complete destruction of the exploitation value 
of the bird artifacts for the traders is somehow less of an economic burden on them 
than the loss of competitive advantage in the otherwise useful data is on Monsanto. The 
Andrus opinion may be best explained as an opinion by Justice Brennan following the 
Penn Central approach of focusing on how many ·of the entire "bundle of sticks" are 
lost as opposed to Justice Rehnquist's approach of focusing on the economic significance 
of the individual stick lost . 
• , 447 u.s. 255 (1980). 
66 450 u.s. 621 (1981). 
67 188 Cal. Rptr. 191 (Ct. App. 1982), appeal dismissed, 104 S. Ct. 53 (1983). 
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the Court has increased in light of several decisions invalidating 
open space zoning on constitutional grounds. 68 
In Agins v. City of Tiburon,69 the landowner had five acres 
of open land with a view of San Francisco Bay. The land was 
rezoned for a residential planned development and open space 
zone, permitting one to five single family residences on the five 
acre tract.70 The owners, without seeking approval from the city 
for any development, brought an inverse condemnation suit71 
claiming that the ordinance itself prohibited development of the 
land and therefore gave rise to a taking.72 A unanimous Court, 
speaking through Justice Powell, held there was no taking. 73 
Powell noted that the ordinance on its face only limited devel-
opment and neither prevented the best use of_ the land nor 
extinguished a fundamental attribute of ownership.74 Signifi-
cantly, the Court did not address the California Supreme Court's 
holding that an action for inverse condemnation could not be 
the basis for damages but only for mandamus or declaratory 
relief.75 Because the Court held that no taking had occurred, it 
did not have to "consider whether a State may limit the remedies 
available to a person whose land has been taken without just 
compensation.' ' 76 
In San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego,77 the 
Court again sidestepped the issue left open in Agins: whether a 
61 See, e.g., Sheerr v. Township of Evesham, 445 A.2d 46 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law 
Div. 1982); Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy 
Hills, 193 A.2d 232 (N.J. 1963); Lemp v. Town Board of Islip, 394 N.Y.S.2d517 (App. 
Div. 1977) . 
.. 447 u.s. 255. 
70 !d. at 257. 
'' The phrase "inverse condemnation" .generally describes a cause of action 
against a government defendant in which a landowner may recover just 
compensation for a "taking" of his property under the Fifth Amendment, 
even though formal condemnation proceedings in exercise of the sovereign's 
power of eminent domain have not been instituted by the government 
entity. . . . In an "inverse condemnation" action, the condemnation is 
"inverse" because it is the landowner, not the government entity, who 
institutes the proceeding. 
San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 450 U.S. at 638 n.2. 
n 447 U.S. at 258. 
" See id. at 263. 
" Id. at 260. 
" See id. at 259. 
76 Id. at 263. 
77 450 u.s. 621. 
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monetary remedy must be provided to a landowner whose prop-
erty is allegedly taken by a regulatory ordinance. 78 As a possible 
site for a nuclear power plant, the power company had pur-
chased a 412-acre parcel, of which 214 acres were subsequently 
rezoned from industrial/ agricultural use to open space. 79 Claim-
ing that the only beneficial use of the property was as an 
industrial park that would be inconsistent with the open space 
zoning, the company sought damages in inverse condemnation. 80 
Although both the trial court and the California Court of Ap-
peals awarded damages for a taking, the California Supreme 
Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and remanded in 
light of its decision in Agins that monetary relief was unavailable 
for a· regulatory taking. 81 On remand the California Court of 
Appeals concluded that monetary relief was unavailable, but 
also concluded that there were factual disputes yet to be resolved 
on the underlying taking issue. 82 As a result, after the California 
Supreme Court denied further review, the United States Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment. 83 The 
majority did, however, note that the constitutional issue, whether 
the company was entitled to a monetary remedy, was "not to 
be cast aside lightly.' '84 In his concurrence as to the absence of 
a final judgment, Justice Rehnquist indicated that on the merits 
he would agree with the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan, 
joined by Justices Stewart, Marshall and Powell, who had reached 
the merits of the case.85 In a strong dissent, Justice Brennan 
stated that a government's exercise of its regulatory police power 
can create a taking within the meaning of the taking clause and 
that, in such circumstances, the Constitution would require just 
compensation for the period beginning on the date the regulation 
effected a taking and ending upon rescission or amendment of 
the offensive regulation by the government entity. 86 
78 See id. at 633. 
79 /d. at 624-25. 
80 !d. at 626. 
8
' See id. at 627-28. 
82 See id. at 629-30. 
8
' See id. at 630. 
84 !d. at 633. 
8
' See id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J ., concurring). 
86 !d. at 653 (Brennan, J ., dissenting). See generally Wright, Damages or Com-
pensation for Unconstitutional Land Use Regulations, 37 Aruc. L. REv. 612 (1984); 
Note, Inverse Condemnation: Valuation of Compensation in Land Use Regulatory Cases, 
17 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 621 (1983). 
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In a recent case wherein the constitutionality of the land use 
regulation turned on the availability of TDRs, the Court once 
again dismissed the appeal for want of a final judgment. 87 In 
the dismissed case, Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa 
Cruz,88 Seascape owned 110 acres, including forty acres of 
benchlands and seventy acres of beachfront property. 89 The 
property at the time of purchase was zoned residential with a 
commercial hotel use allowed on one section of the benchlands. 
The county, after Seascape's unsuccessful attempts to obtain 
development approval, rezoned the property so that all of the 
beachfront property was open space with development prohib-
ited, and so that the benchlands were permitted one family 
residence per 6000 square feet.90 Seascape brought an action for 
damages, inverse condemnation and declaratory relief against 
the county, alleging that the rezoning had deprived it of all 
reasonable use of its property.91 
The California Court of Appeals, relying on Agins, reversed 
the trial court's award of inverse condemnation damages for a 
regulatory taking. 92 Because the trial court had concluded that 
there was a taking of property without just compensation, the 
California Court of Appeals was left with Seascape's cross-
appeal to have the zoning ordinance declared unconstitutional 
as a taking without just compensation. To resolve this issue, the 
court was faced with one of the issues foreseen by Rehnquist in 
his Penn Central dissent: defining the particular property unit 
to be examined for determining the economic return left after 
the purported taking. The alternatives posed to the Court as the 
property unit were the seventy-acre beachfront parcel and the 
110-acre parcel of beachfront and benchland.93 
The court accepted the seventy-acre parcel as the appropriate 
unit, noting that some courts considered the regulatory effect 
on the whole of the owner's property, while others considered 
only the restricted acreage but also took into consideration the 
87 See Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 104 S. Ct. 53. 
" 188 Cal. Rptr. 191. 
89 Id. at 193. 
90 Id. at 194. 
•• I d. at 196-97. 
92 See id. at 196 . 
• , !d. at 196-97. 
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availability of transferable development rights.94 In support of 
their position that the entire 110-acre parcel had to be consid-
ered, the -county quoted Penn Central's statement that 
"It]aking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into 
discrete ·segments and attempt to determine whether rights in 
a particular segment have been entirely abrogated. In deciding 
whether a particular governmental action has been [sic] ef-
fected a taking, this Court focuses rather both on the character 
of the action and on the nature and extent of the interference 
with rights :in the parcel as a whole ... . 95 
The California Court of Appeals correctly concluded, however, 
that the Penn Centra/language suggested only that deprivation 
of one property right did not necessarily entail a taking of the 
property in which the right was asserted.96 To return to the 
"bundle of sticks" analogy, Justice Brennan in Penn Central 
.looked at how many sticks of one bundle had been appropriated, 
not at how many sticks of all or -some of the bundles owned by 
the landowner had been appropriated. 97 It should also be pointed 
out that Penn Central owned other neighboring properties, in-
cluding tbe adjacent Pan-American Building and Commodore 
Hotel, which were eligible to receive the terminal's unused de-
velopment rights.98 Yet the Penn Central opinion did not con-
sider using as the appropriate unit of property any unit other 
than the city tax block designated the landmark site. 99 In that 
sense, Penn Central actually runs counter to the county's argu-
ment in Aptos Seascape that all of the landowner's contiguous 
holdings must be considered. 
94 See id. at 197 (comparing American Dredging v. State Dep't of Envtl. Protec-
tion, 404 A.2d 42 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979) and Multnomah County v. Howell, 
496 P.2d 235 (Or. Ct. App. 1972) with American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. County of 
Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981) and Fifth Avenue Corp. v. Washington County, 
581 :P.2d 50 (Or. 1978)). 
•s Jd. at 198 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
104, 130 (1978)). 
96 See id. 
97 See 438 U.S. at 130-3 I. 
•• Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 1277 (N.Y. 1977), 
ajj'd, 438 U.S. at 104, liS. See also Costonis, The Disparity Issue: A Context for the 
Grand Central Terminal Decision, 91 HARv. L. REv. 402, 419-20 (1977-78) . 
.. See 438 U.S. at 115-16. 
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The California Court of Appeals found the ''most equitable 
accommodation of the conflicting public and private interests at 
stake in a 'takings challenge' H to be consideration of only the 
restricted acreage together with any compensating development 
rights. 100 The court concluded that "when governmental action 
has divided contiguous property under single ownership into 
separate zones, and has restricted development in one of those 
zones, a provision allowing some transfer of development rights 
from the restricted property or awarding compensating densities 
elsewhere may preclude a finding that an unconstitutional taking 
has occurred."101 The key language here is the court's statement 
that the mere existence of a provision ostensibly permitting 
transfer of development rights from the restricted property may 
save the governmental regulation from being a taking. Although 
the trial court had concluded that the county's zoning ordinances 
did not permit transfer of compensatory development rights 
from the beachfront to the benchlands, the court of appeals 
construed the county ordinances to permit the county to grant 
Seascape compensatory densities on both its uplands and bench-
lands. 102 The court of appeals construed the ordinances to give 
the county authority to approve a planned unit development 
(PUD)103 on the benchland with a density greater than one single 
family dwelling per 6,000 square feet. 104 Based on the potential 
for compensating densities, the court upheld the validity of the 
open space ordinance105 and refused to find a taking resulting 
from the ordinance.U16 To ensure the county's compliance with 
its decision, Seascape's taking cause of action was dismissed on 
condition that the county grant Seascape compensatory densities 
or bear the burden in subsequent proceedings that it had made 
provision for compensating densities or some other transfer of 
100 See Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 197. 
101 Id. at 198 (emphasis added). 
102 See id. 
10
' "A [Planned Unit Development] allows the construction of buildings on a tract 
free of conventional zoning so as to permit a cluster of structures and some increased 
density on some portions of a tract, leaving the remainder as open space." Id. at 199. 
See also Dupont Circle Citizens Ass'n. v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n., 355 
A.2d 550 {D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 966 {1976). 
1
"' See 188 Cal. Rptr. at 200. 
10
' See id. at 199. 
106 See id. at 200. 
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development rights in exchange for the prohibition against build-
ing on the beachfront parcel. 107 
B. Defining the Unit of "Property, in Relation to TDRs 
Agins, San Diego Gas, and Aptos Seascape indicate that the 
hypothetical posed in the introduction to this Article is destined 
to reach the Supreme Court. When it does, the unanswered 
questions from Penn Central will have to be addressed: (1) What 
is the appropriate property unit? and (2) Are TDRs relevant to 
the taking determination or to the just compensation determi-
nation? Both issues have already begun to perplex the lower 
courts. 
In a Ninth Circuit case, America Savings & Loan Association 
v. County of Marin, 108 relied upon by the California Court of 
Appeals in Aptos Seascape, 109 the owner of differently zoned, 
but contiguous, twenty-acre and forty-eight-acre lots claimed 
that the twenty-acre lot had been taken by zoning which allowed 
only one multiple residential unit per five acres. 110 The county 
argued that the two parcels were the unit of property by which 
the taking was to be measured; the landowner claimed the twenty-
acre parcel was the appropriate unit. 111 The determinative factor 
in defining the unit of property for the Marin court appears to 
have been the treatment of the parcels by the zoning authority: 
The ordinance isolates the Spit [the forty-eight-acre parcel] in 
a unique zone. Appellant has presented affidavits that there 
were economically viable uses for the Spit which were extin-
guished by the ordinance. Appellant has also presented evi-
dence that the Spit was treated differently for zoning purposes 
than other property, including the Point [the twenty-six-acre 
parcel]. In sum, appellant alleges a deprivation by a non-
uniform ordinance of a portion of its property which is sub-
stantial and otherwise economically viable. This tends to re-
quire that the zoning of the Spit be evaluated separately from 
that of the Point for taking purposes. Yet because appellant 
did not submit a development plan, it is unclear whether the 
107 See id. 
'
08 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981). 
'
09 Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 197. 
110 653 F.2d at 367-68. 
"' Jd. at 368. 
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Spit and Point would be treated separately at the development 
stage. This fact could be crucial. The County might make 
some provision for density transfers or otherwise permit shift-
ing of benefits and burdens between the two. . . . Administra-
tive procedures governed by local ordinances play a key role 
in defining the nature of these benefits and burdens. Until 
appellant submits a development plan, and the County has an 
opportunity to pass on it, it is impossible to determine whether 
the Point and Spit ought to be treated as one parcel or as 
two. 112 
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The inherent difficulty caused by TDR schemes in attempting 
to characterize the zoning authority's treatment of separate par-
cels is that the use of TDRs inextricably links together several 
parcels of property which may or may not be contiguous or 
under the same ownership. By their very nature, TDRs coordi-
nate densities between separate parcels of property, thus in a 
sense making such parcels a unit for planning purposes. 
Penn Central triggered the dilemma of definition, but did 
nothing to resolve it. Its broad suggestion that " 'taking' juris-
prudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete segments"113 
fs easily circumscribed by the facts of the case, as Aptos Seascape 
demonstrates. 114 The Court's reasoning in this context was ad-
dressed to Penn Central's argument that the property in question 
was air rights, which in turn was a segment of a single parcel-
the city tax block designated as the landmark site. Penn Central 
is perhaps more instructive for what it did not do: It did not 
define the property to encompass other contiguous or noncon-
tiguous property owned by Penn Central to which the develop-
ment rights could be transferred. 
Economic considerations should be the underlying predicate 
for all taking claims. From an economic perspective, the true 
impact of the governmental action on the claimant's restricted 
property cannot be measured without reference to the claimant's 
other unrestricted property, the presence of which may alleviate 
112 Id. at 371 (footnotes omitted). 
'" Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 130. 
114 See text accompanying note 96 supra. New York Court of Appeals Judge Breitel 
in Penn Central found that, relative to the question of "reasonable return" under due 
process, it was important that there were receiving parcels in common ownership with 
the landmark site on which the TDRs could be used. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. 
City of New York, 366 N.E.2d at 1277. 
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or conceivably intensify the economic burden borne by the claim-
ant. As the taking question ''necessarily requires a weighing of 
private and public interests," 115 the balance cannot be accurately 
and efficiently struck when the value of th~ claimant's remaining 
interest is determined in an artificial economic vacuum that fails 
to reflect the marketplace. The Penn Central majority decision 
is conducive to a broad-based economic approach to defining 
the property unit. Under Penn Central's approach, restrictive 
land use measures are more likely to withstand taking challenges 
than when tbe subject property is more narrowly defined. The 
willingness of the majority to. consider the value of TDRs in 
relation to the taking question itself reflects a willingness to take 
all relevant economic factors into consideration ab initio in 
determining whether a taking has occurred. 
Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central and the Court's subse-
quent decisions in Kaiser Aetna, PruneYard and Monsanto sug-
gest a different outcome, however. In order to avoid the 
definitional dilemma, the taking issue is determined without 
reference to a permissible/impermissiple percentage of economic 
return, which in turn obviates the need for d~fining tbe property 
unit on which the return is b~sed, The factors which still must 
be taken into account to evaluate when a regulation effects a 
taking are " 'the character of the governmental action, its eco-
nomic impact, and its iJiterference with reasonable investment 
backed expectations.' " 116 T)lus far, most of the Court's elabo-
ration of this standard has focused on the character of the 
governmental action. Kaiser Aetna and particularly Loretto have 
established that a physical invasion, no matter how limited, is 
per se a taking. 117 Within this c~tegory, Justice Rehnquist might 
add from his Penn C(Jntral diss.ent that nllisance regulation .and 
zoning which applies over a broad section of land, thereby 
Hsecur[il!g] .an average reciprocity of advantage," are govern-
mental actions of a character that constitute an exception to the 
taking prohibition.~~~ 
"' Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. at 261. 
m Ruckelshau§ y. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. 28621 2875 (1984) (quoting Prune Yard 
Shopping Center v. Robbins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980)). 
'
17 See Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Ta,kings: A Decisiqna/ Model for the 
Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv, 465 (1983). -
"" 4~8 J:j.S. at l47 (Rehnquist, ,J., .dissenting). 
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It is clear from Rehnquist's Penn Central dissent that he 
views deprivation of property, for purposes of the taking clause, 
as the deprivation of a property right or rights, not as the 
deprivation of a degree of economic return on some undefined 
physical unit of real property: 
The term [property] is not used in the "vulgar and untechnical 
sense of the physical thing with respect to which the citizen 
exercises rights recognized by law. [Instead, it] ... denotes[s] 
the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation to the 
physical· thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of 
it . ... The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort 
of interest the citizen may possess." 119 
Monsanto extends this reasoning to the conclusion that depri-
vation of a single property right, the right to exclude others, 
may be a taking without regard to the economic value of any 
remaining rights in the property .120 
Ostensibly, then, under Justice Rehnquist's approach there 
is no need for definition of the property unit. Yet the problem 
resurfaces in another context: the two unexplored factors of 
"economic impact" and "interference with reasonable invest,. 
ment backed expectation.'' 121 As first formulated in Penn Central 
these were not separate and distinct factors; rather, interference 
with investment-backed expectations was the most significant 
aspect of economic impact.122 Indeed, the two factors are inex-
tricably linked in Monsanto. Having concluded that the FIFRA 
conferred a reasonable investment-backed expectation of confi-
dentiality in the submitted data, the Court reasoned that the 
right to exclude others was so central to a trade secret and its 
economic value that destruction of this right alone was tanta-
mount to a taking of the trade secret, 123 The remaining uses for 
119 /d. at 142-43 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. General Motors 
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1945) (emphasis in original)). Not surprisingly, General 
Motors is again quoted in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.: " 'Governmental action short 
of acquistion of title or occupancy has been held, if its effects are so complete as to 
deprive the owner of all or most of his interest in the subject matter, to amount to a 
taking.' " 104 S. Ct. at 2874 (quoting 323 U.S. at 378 (emphasis added)). 
120 See text accompanying notes 63-64 supra. 
121 See 438 U.S. at 124. 
122 ld. 
m See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. at 2878. 
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the trade data were deemed "irrelevant" to the "economic im-
pact of the EPA action on Monsanto's property right." 124 
Monsanto holds less hope for the future of TDR schemes 
than did Penn Central. Under Justice Brennan's approach in 
Penn Central, Monsanto's loss of competitive advantage and 
potential profits probably would have been insufficient for a 
taking because the data did have vestigial uses of some value. 
Those remaining uses would not have been irrelevant, but would 
have been determinative of whether a taking had occurred. Mon-
santo's more stringent approach toward regulation, if applied in 
the land use context, comes very close to contradicting the axiom 
that regulatory deprivation of property's most beneficial use does 
not render the regulation unconstitutional. 125 Given the imper-
manence of zoning, the requirement that there be interference 
with a reasonable investment-backed expectation could be viewed 
as militating against a proliferation of successful taking chal-
lenges. Yet, in Kaiser Aetna the Corps of Engineers' approval 
for a dredging permit was viewed by Justice Rehnquist as leading 
to "fruition" of a right to exclude others from the property. 126 
In any event, the "property right" approach leaves little room 
for TDRs to redeem the zoning measure. This approach focuses 
narrowly on the right which has been taken, without regard 
either to remaining rights in the property or to what benefits 
might be conferred in return for the restrictions. 
In short, Penn Central poses no immediate barriers to TDR 
land planning techniques that impose severe restrictions on a 
single parcel of property in a planning area. The opinion on its 
face supports looking at the restricted parcel in conjunction with 
the value of the TDRs to determine the extent of economic 
interference. Even if the ordinance were to deprive the landowner 
of all reasonable return on the property, therefore, it is conceiv-
able that the TDRs might redeem the ordinance from a taking 
perspective. Moreover, in its underlying receptiveness to a broad-
based economic analysis of the impact of the regulation, Penn 
Central leaves open the economically sound possibility that the 
regulatory impact could be determined with reference to all of 
the landowner's contiguous property that functions as an eco-
124 Id. (emphasis added). 
125 See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962). 
126 Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979). 
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nomic unit in response to the regulation. Under either analysis, 
a taking is unlikely to occur unless the landowner is deprived of 
all or almost all of the defined property's reasonable use and 
the TDRs fail to have a reasonable, ascertainable value. How-
ever, if Kaiser Aetna, PruneYard and Monsanto are seen as a 
reformulation of taking jurisprudence along the lines of the Penn 
Central dissent, the property right, not the property unit, is 
determinative of a taking challenge. If the right itself is central 
to the type of property at issue, its deprivation may be enough 
to constitute a taking, without regard to any remaining uses, to 
other economically related property, or to the availability of 
TDRs. Given Monsanto's recent emphasis on loss of profit 
potential, deprivation of the right to develop property stands a 
better chance of protection under the taking clause. With TDRs 
relegated to the issue of just compensation, zoning prohibitions 
against any development may not withstand a taking challenge 
under this approach. 
C. The Second Issue: Are TDRs a Panacea for 
a Taking, or (Un)just Compensation? 
Transferable development rights can be viewed as a hybrid 
of the police power and eminent domain, a synthesis of regula-
tion and compensation.127 By granting TDRs, has the zoning 
authority avoided a taking or has it obviated the issue by pro-
viding remuneration for lost rights? In Penn Central, Justice 
Brennan assumed that the value of the TDRs was relevant to 
determining whether a taking had occurred; Justice Rehnquist 
found a taking without reference to the TDRs and would have 
remanded for a determination of their value as just compensa-
tion.128 Neither Justice explained his underlying assumption as 
to the relevance of the TDRs to the two-part inquiry of "taking" 
and "just compensation." The question is certainly not aca-
demic. TDRs appear much less likely to be an effective barrier 
to a taking challenge under the rubric of just compensation than 
under the multifactor concept of "reasonable use." Although 
much has been written on regulatory schemes which may best 
127 SeeM. GITELMAN, LAND UsE 465-69 (3d ed. 1982). 
121 See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. at 152 (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
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insure the economic viability of TDRs, 129 the fact remains that 
even the most carefully tailored TDR scheme provides no direct 
monetary compensation and depends upon market factors be-
yond a zoning authority's control. The Supreme Court's analysis 
in Agins and San Diego demonstrates that nonmonetary remedies 
for a taking will be closely scrutinized.130 
Few cases other than Penn Central have grappled with con-
stitutional challenges to TDRs, and these decisions provide little, 
if any, insight into the taking/compensation dichotomy. The two 
lower court cases from New York on the constitutionality of 
TDRs, the New York Court of Appeals' decision in Penn 
Central131 and that court's pre-Penn Central decision in Fred F. 
French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 132 are confined to a 
due process analysis. In French, the New York Court of Appeals 
refused to recognize an action for compensation predicated on 
a regulatory taking. 133 The proper due process inquiry, according 
to the court, was whether the zoning ordinance was unreasonable 
in that it destroyed the economic value of the property. 134 In this 
regard, the court stated that the TDRs "may not be disregarded 
in determining whether the ordinance has destroyed the economic 
value of the underlying property." 135 The court never had to 
confront the eminent domain issue of whether the value of the 
TDRs became relevant initially to the existence of a taking, or 
secondarily as compensation. Chief Judge Breitel found that the 
city's downzoning of the parks to zero density, coupled 'vith 
"floating development rights, utterly unusable until they could 
be attached to some accommodating real property,'' was a dep-
rivation of property without due process of law .136 The Chief 
Judge contrasted with approval the "development bank" or so-
129 See, e.g., Delaney, Kominers & Gordon, TDR Redux: A Second Generation of 
Practical Legal Courses, IS URB. LAw. 593 (1983); Richman & Kendeg, Transfer De-
velopment Rights-A Pragmatic View, 9 URB. LAw. 571 (1977). 
130 See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255; Aptos Seascape Corp. v. County 
of Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191. 
131 Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 366 N.E.2d 1271. 
132 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976). 
m See 350 N.E.2d at 385. 
134 See id. at 387. 
135 ld. 
136 Id. at 388. 
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called "Chicago Plan"137 by which a State is able to condemn 
development rights and pay directly for them in exercising its 
eminent domain power. 13s 
In the New York Court of Appeals decision in Penn Cen-
tral, 139 Chief Judge Breitel reaffirmed the French holding that 
due process, not the taking clause, provided the framework for 
evaluating a claim of inverse condemnation.140 In an innovative 
opinion, the court upheld the landmark preservation ordinance 
and its TDR program. 141 Ostensibly distinguishing the French 
case, Chief Judge Breitel noted that the ."transferable above-
the-surface development rights which, because they may be at-
tached to specific parcels of property, some already owned by 
Penn Central or its affiliates, may be considered as part of the 
owner's return on the terminal property."142 One commentator 
has pointed out that the ownership of recipient parcels by a 
landowner with TDRs is a slender reed upon which to turn a 
due process clause. 143 Under this analysis, one rationale for the 
differing results in French and Penn Central is that in French 
no residual return was possible after the downzoning to zero 
density of the parks, so that the TDRs were the only possibility 
of return. 144 The most innovative section of the French opinion 
attempts to define the "reasonable return" necessary to save the 
regulation from a due process claim. The opinion concluded that 
the base for computing a reasonable return should exclude the 
"social increment" of value attributable to the government's 
activities rather than to private investment. 145 
One recent lower court case has squarely confronted the issue 
of whether TDRs should be categorized as economic return 
relevant to the taking question or, assuming a taking is found 
without reference to the TDRs' value, as just compensation. In 
137 This approach to preserving landmarks in "high development" areas was devel-
oped in Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urban 
Landmarks, 85 HARv. L. REv. 574 (1971-72). 
1
" See 350 N.E.2d at 388. 
"
9 366 N.E.2d 1271. 
"" See id. at 1274. 
1
" See id. at 1271. 
1
" Id. at 1273. 
10 See Costonis, supra note 98, at 421. 
1
" Id. at 420. 
1
'' See 366 N.E.2d at 1276. 
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Dufour v. Montgomery County Council, 146 a county ordinance 
rezoned much of the agricultural land as "agricultural reserve," 
downzoning the reserve from one dwelling per five acres to one 
dwelling per twenty-five acres. 147 Each landowner in the agricul-
tural reserve, the sending zone, was assigned transferable devel-
opment rights of one residential unit per five acres which could 
be sold to developers in designated receiving areas. 148 The county 
established a development rights bank149 to purchase and sell 
development rights until sufficient receiving areas are designated 
to establish a strong private market. 150 Holding that an exercise 
of police power could effectuate a taking for which compensa-
tion must be provided, the Montgomery County Circuit Court 
concluded, even without consideration of the TDRs, that the 
downzoning was not tantamount to denial of "all reasonable 
use" of the property .151 
In an alternative finding, the Dufour court determined that 
the TDRs buttressed its holding that a taking had not occurred, 
even though at the time of the downzoning no receiving areas 
had been designated, 152 no interim development rights bank had 
been established and the value of the TDRs was in all likelihood 
"substantially below 'just compensation' for the diminution in 
value." 153 Noting the apparent controversy over whether TDRs 
should be evaluated as an alleviation of the property owner's 
burden or as just compensation, 154 the court accepted without 
146 Dufour v. Montgomery County Council, No. 56964, slip op. at 15 (Montgomery 
County Cir. Ct. Md. Jan. 20, 1983). 
147 For a description of the Montgomery County ordinance, see U.S.D.A., 5 Farm-
line 6 (May 1984). See also Duncan, supra note 1, at 122. 
148 For a more detailed analysis of the Montgomery County plan, see Duncan, 
supra note 1, at 122-24. 
149 See Costonis, supra note 137, at 620-31. 
'"' Duncan, supra note 1, at 123. 
'" See No. 56964, slip op. at 15. 
"
2 The court, however, did not entirely rule out the possibility that it might be 
necessary to have a fact finding hearing on whether a temporary taking had occurred 
before designation of the receiving areas. See id. slip op. at 19. 
'" Id. slip op. at 17-18. 
154 The court, in addition to noting Justice Rehnquist's position in the Penn Central 
dissent, erroneously cited French for the proposition that TDRs were relevant to the 
threshold taking issue. See id. The French decision utilized a due process analysis and 
explicitly refused to hold that overregulation could be framed as a taking claim. See text 
accompanying notes 133-38 supra. 
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further analysis Justice Brennan's reasoning in Penn Central that 
TDRs were relevant to the impact of the regulation. 155 Relying 
on its other holding that even without reference to the TDRs no 
taking had occurred, the court decided not to receive evidence 
on the fair market value of the TDRs. 156 Clearly, the court felt 
a need for further guidance from the appellate courts in com-
puting the value of TDRs. If, indeed, recent Supreme Court 
cases demonstrate a movement toward Justice Rehnquist's ap-
proach to the taking issue, a more troublesome prospect is that 
TDRs would be deemed irrelevant to the threshold issue of 
whether a taking has occurred. As discussed earlier, 157 even the 
most carefully planned TDR ordinance may run afoul of the 
strictly interpreted mandate of just compensation. From an eco-
nomic, legal and public policy perspective, the value of TDRs 
fits much less comfortably within the rubric of "just compen-
sation" than within that of a "taking." 
An economic analysis of Justice Rehnquist's position in Penn 
Central is particularly appropriate since his criticism of the ma-
jority's approach echoes Professor Michelman's economics-based 
critique of traditional taking jurisprudence: 
[T]o determine compensability one is expected to focus on the 
particular "thing" injuriously affected and to inquire what 
proportion of its value is destroyed by the measure in question. 
If this proportion is so large as to approach totality, compen-
sation is due; otherwise, not. It is not easy to see the relevance 
of this particular inquiry to just decision. 
The difficulty is aggravated when the question is raised of 
how to define the "particular thing" whose value is to furnish 
the denominator of the fraction. Let us suppose that I own a 
tract of unimproved land. Is the land necessarily one "thing" 
for this purpose, or might it be several? Can it, for example, ever 
be regarded as geographically divided into more than one thing? 
Evidently, it can be; for, if we imagine government's practically 
forbidding me any use of a geographically determined quarter 
of my farm, it is not likely that the obligation to compensate can 
"' No. 56964, slip op. at 16. 
,,. See id. slip op. at 18. 
"' See text accompanying notes 35-38 supra. 
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be escaped by the argument that only a quarter of the value of 
the "thing" has been destroyed. 158 
Reformulating the traditional diminution of value test to 
better reflect its purpose in fairly distributing the benefits and 
burdens within society, Michelman states: 
All this suggests that the common way of stating the test under 
discussion-in terms of a vaguely located critical point on a 
sliding scale-is misleading (though certainly a true represen-
tation of the language repeatedly used by Holmes). The cus-
tomary labels-magnitude of the harm test, or diminution of 
value test-obscure the test's foundations by conveying the 
idea that it calls for an arbitrary pinpointing of a critical 
proportion (probably lying somewhere between fifty and one 
hundred percent). More sympathetically perceived, however, 
the test poses not nearly so loose a question of degree; it does 
not ask "how much," but rather (like the physical-occupation 
test) it asks "whether or not": whether or not the measure in 
question can easily be seen to have practically deprived the 
claimant of some distinctly perceived, sharply crystallized, in-
vestment-backed expectation. 159 
In Monsanto, PruneYard, Kaiser Aetna and Penn Central, 
the Court has stated that three factors are relevant to a taking: 
''the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, 
158 Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Founda-
tions of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1192-93 (1967) (emphasis 
in original) (footnotes omitted). Justice Rehnquist's approach is criticized by Professor 
Michelman: 
It might thus appear that the scope of the "thing" subject to devaluation 
is to be defined by the incidence of the measure itself. But if that is so, 
will it not begin to seem as though all use restrictions are totally destructive 
of value? Suppose I am forbidden to remove gravel from my land, or to 
use my land for a foundry. Inasmuch as mining rights are well recognized, 
divisible interests in land, and inasmuch as "rights" to particular surface 
uses have come to be recognized as species of "property" under the label 
of "easement" or "servitude," why not say that my land consists of two 
"things" -mining rights and surface rights, or foundry rights and residue-
and that the relevant denominator in testing a regulation which impinges 
only on mining rights or foundry rights is the value of those rights-which 
the regulation totally destroys? Why, in other words, should a regulation's 
own scope sometimes define the geographical, but not the functional, extent 
of the "thing" said to be regulated? 
Id. at 1193 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
"
9 Id. at 1233. 
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and its interference with reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions."160 Any evaluation of the economic impact of the regu-
lation is necessarily incomplete without inclusion of the value of 
TDRs in the taking computation. Whatever might be the eco-
nomic wisdom or lack thereof in excluding the value of postre-
gulation vestigial rights from the economic tally, it is unjustifiably 
myopic to exclude the economic value of TDRs that relate di-
rectly to the economic value of the specific property right alleg-
edly being taken. For example, even if the Rehnquist approach 
would exclude the economic value of remaining uses of the 
restricted property (e.g., recreational, agricultural) from the eco-
nomic impact computation, why exclude the market value of 
TDRs in relation to the economic loss which the TDRs are 
designed to offset? 
With reference to the relatively unexplored element of "in-
terference with reasonable investment-backed expectation," the 
Court will be confronted with a traditional zoning analysis. 
Under such analysis, absent perhaps some governmental action 
which reasonably induced good faith reliance either on a right 
to continued development as in Kaiser Aetna161 or on utilization 
of profit potential as existed in Monsanto, 162 there are no vested 
rights to develop based on reliance on any preexisting zoning 
scheme. 163 Whether as a general rule there exists a reasonable 
investment-backed expectation of some development, no matter 
how minimal, remains to be seen. Implicit in the concept of land 
use regulation is the premise that property rights are not abso-
lute. Of all the so-called property rights, a right to develop one's 
property is the most likely source of conflict and, concomitantly, 
the right most likely to necessitate compromise. It is no longer 
reasonable to expect one's property rights to extend "from the 
center usque ad coelum."164 A theory of taking jurisprudence 
which reinstates the right to develop as fundamental or para-
1
"' Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 104 S. Ct. at 2875 (quoting 447 U.S. at 83). 
161 See 444 U.S. 164. 
162 See 104 S. Ct. at 2877-79. 
163 See, e.g., Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South Coast Regional Comm'n, 
553 P.2d 546 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1083 (1977); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 
542 P.2d 237 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904 (1976); Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional 
Planning Council, 442 So. 2d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
164 Hay v. Cahoes Co., 2 N.Y. 159 (1849). 
790 KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 73 
mount fails to reflect the modern realities of land use regulation 
or the expectations of the property owner. 
From a legal perspective, the better analysis is to consider 
TDRs in relation to both the taking issue and the just compen-
sation issue. In a regulatory taking two related constitutional 
challenges may be made-deprivation of due process and taking 
without just compensation. 165 The second challenge consists of 
two distinct components-"taking" and "just compensation." 
Relegating TDRs to the just compensation evaluation leads to 
an anomalous result. The question common to both challenges-
, whether the landowner may still make a reasonable return on 
the property166-would include consideration of the TDRs' value 
under the due process analysis but not under a taking analysis. 
For purposes of due process analysis there is only a one-part 
inquiry-whether there is a reasonable return-to which the 
value of TDRs is either relevant or irrelevant. There is no second 
inquiry under which the TDRs may be considered. To totally 
exclude the value of TDRs from a due process analysis appears 
unjustifiable, yet inclusion of this value would result in a more 
expansive due process analysis of economic impact than permit-
ted under the taking clause. 
Justice Rehnquist's criticism of Justice Brennan's approach 
remains: If a taking is judged by the diminution in value of the 
property as a whole, what is the appropriate property unit in 
any given case? A solution to this issue may be found in the 
Court's formulation of the "Ben A von doctrine" of judicial 
review for constitutional facts. This doctrine was developed in 
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 167 where a water 
company claimed that the Pennsylvania Public Service Commis-
sion's valuation of company property was so low as to be 
confiscatory. 168 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court utilized the 
usual substantial evidence standard for review of the facts rele-
vant to the confiscation issue. 169 The United States Supreme 
Court, however, held that this scope of review was too narrow: 
1
" See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra. 
166 See text accompanying notes 26, 33 supra. 
167 253 u.s. 287 (1920). 
168 See id. at 288. 
169 Id. 
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In all such cases, if the owner claims a confiscation of his 
property will result, the State must provide a fair opportunity 
for submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determina-
tion upon its own independent judgment as to both law and 
facts; otherwise the order is void because in conflict with the 
due process clause, Fourteenth Amendment.170 
791 
The Ben A von holding that agencies cannot finally determine 
constitutional facts has not been followed since 1936 and, in 
some cases, may even have been contradicted. 171 Although the 
doctrine has never been overruled, the Supreme Court has de-
clared ''it is now settled that a utility has no right to relitigate 
factual questions on the ground that constitutional rights are 
involved." 172 To the extent that the Ben A von doctrine of judicial 
review is still alive, it mandates full review of constitutional facts 
only where deprivation of personal, rather than property, rights 
is at issue. 173 As Justice Brandeis has stated, "when dealing with 
property a much more liberal rule [of review in favor of the 
agency] applies. " 174 
Drawing upon the Ben A von doctrine in its present form, it 
is perhaps time that the Supreme Court disengage itself from 
"ad hoc factual" inquiries where property, rather than personal, 
rights are involved. As ratemaking became more and more fac-
tually complex, the Court saved itself from the quagmire of 
active judicial review of facts and deferred to agency findings. 
The Court should take a similar approach to taking cases. Tak-
ing jurisprudence is relatively unique in that the Court continues 
to engage in broad factual inquiries although property rights, 
rather than personal rights, are implicated. Greater deference to 
the planning agency's findings as to the appropriate unit of 
property would serve the interests of judicial economy, yet ju-
dicial review of the ultimate issue of whether a taking had 
occurred would be preserved. Moreover, regardless of whether 
TDRs are held to be relevant to the taking or to the just 
compensation issue, the Court will at some point find itself 
170 /d. at 289. 
171 See B. ScHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 767-69 (2d ed. 1984). 
m Alabama Public Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341, 348 (1951). 
173 See B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 171, at 629-32. 
174 See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 77 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J ., concurring). 
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obligated under its present scope of review to ascertain the 
economic value of TDRs in a limitless range of economic situ-
ations. When that occurs, deference to the local planning agen-
cy's expertise should be effected through reviewing facts under 
the traditional substantial evidence standard. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court appears to be moving toward a taking jurisprud-
ence which would elevate certain select property rights, and 
potentially the "right to develop," above other rights and above 
the needs of the community. This approach invites conflict be-
tween standards for a taking violation and those for a due 
process violation. It focuses on the nature of the property right, 
rather than on the true economic impact of the regulation and 
the public policy concerns for preservation. Although the coun-
tervailing "diminution in value" approach necessitates some def-
inition of the property taken, such factual matters may best be 
left, under either approach, to the expertise of the local planning 
agency. Regardless of which approach prevails, at some point 
the Court will find itself confronted with a complex evaluation 
of the economic value of TDRs. It is difficult to posit a question 
which calls more for judicial deference to the expertise of the 
local planning agency. 
TDRs are an innovative advance in preservation techniques. 
When well planned and implemented, TDRs promise an equi-
table distribution of the costs of preservation among all of those 
who would benefit from it. Farmland, landmarks and scenic 
open areas are "public goods" like clean air and clean water; 
without regulation of the allocation of preservation costs, these 
costs will not fall proportionally on all those who benefit from 
preservation. 175 If TDRs do not fit neatly into our traditional 
concepts of police power versus eminent domain, regulation 
versus compensation, the fault may not lie with TDRs as much 
as with the traditional concepts. Land use is indeed one of the 
areas, like medicine and technology, in which innovation has 
rendered many legal precepts inadequate or obsolete. There is a 
need for greater flexibility in taking jurisprudence, and this need 
"' See Davis & Karnien, Externalities and the Quality of Air and Water, in Eco-
NOMICS OF Am. AND WATER POLLUTION 12-19 (\V. Walker ed. 1969). 
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can be met through increased deference to the difficult economic 
and administrative findings made by local planning agencies. 
The present approach of the Court toward a hierarchy of prop-
erty rights suggests there will be less flexibility and, accordingly, 
less of a future for innovative land use planning. 
